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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are law professors who specialize in evidence
and criminal law and procedure. 1 As legal academics,
amici have an interest in the consistent and correct
application of the rules of evidence, and in reconciling
those rules with the constitutional right to a fair trial.
The brief is joined by the following professors:
Barbara Allen Babcock, Judge John
Professor of Law, Emerita, Stanford Law School.

Crown

Jeffrey Bellin, Cabell Research Professor of Law,
William and Mary Law School.
Robert P. Burns, William W. Gurley Memorial
Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law.
Sherman J. Clark, Kirkland & Ellis Professor of
Law, University of Michigan Law School.
James E. Coleman, Jr., John S. Bradway Professor
of the Practice of Law, Duke University School of Law.
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no counsel or party
authored this brief in whole or part. Duke University School of Law
supports faculty research and scholarship, and that financial support
contributed to the costs of preparing this brief. Otherwise, no person
or entity apart from the amici and their counsel made any monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
brief. Duke University is not a signatory to the brief, and the views
expressed here are solely those of the amici. The parties’ letters of
consent to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk’s
Office.
1

2
Lisa Kern Griffin,
University School of Law.

Professor

of

Law,

Duke

Robert P. Mosteller, J. Dickson Phillips
Distinguished Professor of Law, UNC School of Law.
Deborah
Tuerkheimer,
Professor
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law.

of

Law,

Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson II Professor of
Law and Professor of Psychology, Duke University School
of Law.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The petition raises the question whether the rules
prohibiting juror impeachment should give way to
constitutional concerns when a jury member comes
forward with evidence of racially or ethnically biased
statements made during deliberations about a criminal
defendant’s guilt. The question is an important one that
has deeply divided both federal and state courts. See Pet.
App. 23a n.4 (Marquez, J., dissenting).
Applying this Court’s previous decisions on the
scope of Rule 606(b) will not resolve the split in authority
going forward. In two previous cases, the Court has not
found fair trial concerns significant enough to override
Rule 606(b), but it has left open the question at issue
here. Both the substance and the structure of the juror
statements made in this case distinguish it from this
Court’s earlier decisions. Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107, 127 (1987), concerned juror competency rather
than juror prejudice. In Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521
(2014), the Court addressed a juror’s partiality in a
matter “internal” to deliberations and ordinarily covered
by Rule 606(b), but that case did not involve bigotry
specifically directed at a criminal defendant. Moreover,
the Warger decision noted that “[t]here may be cases of
juror bias so extreme” that the no-impeachment rule could
give way. 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3. This Court should now
recognize that explicit racial or ethnic prejudice against a
criminal defendant falls into this category, resolving the
existing conflict. The balance of interests is markedly
different in such cases than in Tanner or Warger.
First, the fundamental unfairness of a guilty
verdict tainted by racial prejudice raises particularly
acute constitutional concerns. In this case, the right to a
fair criminal trial, its essential component of an impartial
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jury, and the grave threat to impartiality that racial or
ethnic bias poses all converge. See Wright v. United
States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“If a
criminal defendant could show that the jury was racially
prejudiced, such evidence could not be ignored without
trampling the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a fair
trial and an impartial jury.”). Indeed, racial or ethnic
prejudice against a defendant abridges the fair trial right
almost “by definition.” Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3.
Second, juror testimony is likely to be the only
available evidence to establish such prejudice. The “usual
safeguards” this Court has pointed to in prior cases are
not “sufficient to protect the integrity of the process” in
cases of racial or ethnic bias. Id. Moreover, the
administrability concerns that arise with general claims
of juror dishonesty or partiality are not present in the
narrower and clearer context of expressly racist
considerations. The impairment in Tanner was also of a
type that could be exposed through means other than
reliance on juror testimony. Intoxication may be
observable during the trial and is a potential subject of
testimony by non-jurors. Similarly, the kind of bias at
issue in Warger—a juror’s “views about negligence
liability for car crashes” that resulted from a prior
accident involving her daughter, id. at 529—is more likely
to be discernable from external evidence or revealed
during voir dire than racial or ethnic prejudice against a
defendant.
Third, the experience of jurisdictions that have
admitted juror testimony on the limited question of racial
or ethnic bias suggests that consistently recognizing the
exception will not unduly infringe on juror privacy or
meaningfully burden the courts. The concern about
bigotry has some self-limiting mechanisms. Courts have
continued to apply the no-impeachment rule unless
statements are overtly racist, objectively verifiable, and

5
focused on a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence.
Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 606(b), courts already
consider juror testimony on “extraneous prejudicial
information” such as media accounts and “outside
influences” such as threats and bribes. Although the
statements of ethnic animus at issue in this case occurred
“during the jury’s deliberations” within the meaning of
the rule, an additional constitutional exception can be
administered just as the enumerated exceptions are. The
initial factual question is an objective one: whether a
racist comment pertaining to the case was uttered. In
addition, with regard to a juror’s racial or ethnic prejudice
against a defendant, courts need not inquire into the
statement’s effect on internal mental processes in order to
address the issue of a remedy.
Finally, the policy justifications for Rule 606(b) are
not served by applying it in this context. Permitting
verdicts tainted by racial or ethnic bias to remain in place
in the interest of “finality” does profound harm to the
criminal justice system. Moreover, public confidence in
the “integrity” of adjudication declines when racial or
ethnic prejudice comes to light but evidentiary rules bar
its consideration. A criminal defendant’s right to assert
that the jury deliberations were racially tainted currently
depends on the jurisdiction in which the case arises.
Leaving potentially unconstitutional verdicts entirely
“beyond effective reach” in some jurisdictions will only
promote “irregularity and injustice.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b),
Advisory Committee Note to subdivision (b). This Court
has long recognized that there must be a measure of
flexibility in the no-impeachment rule because cases
might arise in which its rigid application violates “the
plainest principles of justice.” McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.
264, 269 (1915); see also Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3.
The alleged prejudice at issue here presents such a case.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE
PARAMOUNT
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERN
WITH
RACIAL
OR
ETHNIC
DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST
CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS SHOULD OVERRIDE THE
EVIDENTIARY BAR TO IMPEACHMENT BY
JUROR TESTIMONY.

This case arises at the intersection of the Sixth
Amendment fair trial guarantee and the difficult and
lasting problem of racial prejudice among jurors. Racial or
ethnic bias is an “especially pernicious” form of prejudice
in the criminal justice process to which this Court applies
special scrutiny. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555
(1979); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58
(1992) (a defendant has “a right to an impartial jury that
can view him without racial animus, which so long has
distorted our system of criminal justice”); Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting the Court’s “unceasing efforts to eradicate racial
prejudice from our criminal justice system”).
The Court has been vigilant, for example, about
state-sponsored prejudice when prosecutors exercise
peremptory
challenges
of
jurors
for
racially
discriminatory reasons. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 88 (1986); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
238 (2005) (“When the government’s choice of jurors is
tainted with racial bias,” then “the very integrity of the
courts is jeopardized.”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411
(1991) (“The jury acts as a vital check against wrongful
exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors. The
intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury selection
process damages both the fact and the perception of this
guarantee.”) (internal citation omitted).
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The Court should be no less vigilant when
allegations arise that overt racial or ethnic prejudice has
tainted a jury’s guilty verdict. Cf. McCollum, 505 U.S. at
62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (cautioning against “exalting
the rights of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the
criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not
the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death”).
Indeed, “the constitutional interests of the affected party
are at their strongest when a jury employs racial bias in
reaching its verdict.” 27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor
James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6074, at
513 (2d ed. 2007).
In this case involving sexual assault and
harassment, a seated juror argued during deliberations
that “Mexican men take whatever they want,” Pet. App.
4a., that “Mexican men had a bravado that caused them
to believe they could do whatever they wanted with
women,” id., that “Mexican men [are] physically
controlling of women because they have a sense of
entitlement,” id., and that the juror’s experience in law
enforcement suggested that “nine times out of ten
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward
women and young girls.” Id.
The focused prejudice here represents a much more
substantial defect in the proceedings than the bias at
issue in the Warger case. When partiality comes in the
form of racial or ethnic prejudice, it “undermines the
jury’s ability to perform its function as a buffer against
governmental oppression and, in fact, converts the jury
itself into an instrument of oppression.” Wright & Gold §
6074, at 513. Racial animus, moreover, raises particularly
significant constitutional issues in criminal cases, which
is a context that Warger did not present. See Rose, 443
U.S. at 563.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), though otherwise
applicable to the statements of jurors during
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deliberations, should yield to these constitutional
concerns when it shields racially motivated factfinders. As
this Court has previously stated, “no right ranks higher
than the right of the accused to a fair trial,” Press-Enter.
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984), and “the
inestimable privilege of trial by jury” underlies “the whole
administration of criminal justice.” Holland, 493 U.S. at
511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The guarantee of an
impartial jury “goes to the very integrity of the legal
system.” Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987).
Fundamental fairness depends on factfinders who are free
from any “predisposition about the defendant’s
culpability.” Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873
(1989). Jurors are not “impartial” in the “constitutional
sense of that term” if they have “strong and deep
impressions” that “close the mind against the testimony
that may be offered in opposition to them.” United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807); see also
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366 (1966) (per curiam)
(“[P]etitioner was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even
10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors”); Aldridge v.
United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313 (1931) (A “gross
injustice” is perpetrated if a juror “entertain[s] a prejudice
which would preclude his rendering a fair verdict.”);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879)
(Prejudices against “particular classes” that “sway the
judgment of jurors” “deny to persons of those classes the
full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy.”).
In construing the common law precursor to 606(b),
the Court has held that the no-impeachment rule must be
sufficiently pliable to accommodate the interests of
justice. See McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269; see also Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933); United States v.
Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851). This conclusion is
consonant with the Court’s broader jurisprudence about
conflicts between fair trial rights and exclusionary rules.
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When evidentiary bars “insulate from discovery the
violation of constitutional rights,” they may “themselves
violate those rights.” Wright & Gold § 6074, at 513.
Accordingly, the Court has also held that the rules of
evidence must give way when they preclude “the
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 331 (2006);
see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (“In
these unique circumstances, ‘the hearsay rule may not be
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.’”)
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302
(1973)); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) (“The
State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a
juvenile offender’s record cannot require yielding of so
vital a constitutional right as the effective crossexamination for bias of an adverse witness.”).
When the Court balances competing interests to
determine whether a defendant’s fair trial rights should
override an evidentiary exclusion, the central question is
whether “the interests served by a rule justify the
limitation imposed on a defendant’s constitutional right.”
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987). The policy
interests behind enforcement of Rule 606(b) are simply “at
their weakest” in cases of jury bias involving racial
prejudice. See Wright & Gold § 6074, at 513. Because
racial or ethnic animus by jurors poses a particular
danger to fair trial rights, the Rule 606(b) bar should not
preclude consideration of juror testimony about the
narrow category of statements expressly revealing such
prejudice during deliberations.
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II.

THE
SUPREME
COURT’S
DECISIONS
ADDRESSING THE SCOPE OF EXCEPTIONS TO
606(B) WILL NOT RESOLVE THE CONFLICT
CONCERNING JUROR TESTIMONY ABOUT
RACIAL OR ETHNIC BIAS.

This Court’s previous decisions declining to permit
juror testimony on statements during deliberations
depend on alternate mechanisms for revealing sources of
unfairness that will not work effectively in instances of
racial or ethnic bias. The Tanner Court envisioned safety
valves through which alleged biases could still be revealed
and addressed: surface protections like external
observation and the voir dire process, as well as non-juror
or pre-verdict evidence of misconduct. The Colorado
Supreme Court, and those courts that have adopted a
similar approach, have relied on these safeguards to
conclude that the Tanner protections are “also available to
expose racial biases.” United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d
1230, 1240 (CA10 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1051
(2009).
Visual observation by the judge, counsel, or court
personnel, however, can do little to bring racial or ethnic
bias to light. Incompetence and prejudice reveal
themselves differently. For example, non-jurors are
unlikely witnesses to prejudicial statements about a
defendant, even though they can often testify to
misconduct like intoxication. Racial prejudice also lies
especially well hidden. The bias at issue in Warger—a
juror’s sympathy with a defendant who had caused a car
accident—might have been established through objective
evidence about her personal history, or through
statements that she made outside of the jury room. But
evidence outside of the jury deliberations is unlikely to
reveal a juror’s racially discriminatory reaction to the
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evidence at trial. Although there could be indications of
animus such as membership in certain groups, complaints
involving other racial discrimination, or past behavior
towards individuals of other races or ethnicities, those
external signals would not necessarily link to invidious
discrimination against a criminal defendant.
The voir dire process, moreover, is even less likely
to uncover racial or ethnic prejudice in jurors. Voir dire
questioning might expose incentives like the Warger
juror’s potential identification with the defendant because
of her daughter’s experience. Nothing inhibited the
Warger juror from freely expressing her views about
liability for car accidents during voir dire. When it comes
to racial or ethnic bias, a juror can hardly be expected to
acknowledge that he harbors some prejudice. A juror
“may have an interest in concealing his own bias” or may
even be “unaware of it.” See McDonough Power Equip.,
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans,
American Juries: The Verdict 91 (2007); Maria Krysan,
Privacy and the Expression of White Racial Attitudes: A
Comparison Across Three Contexts, 62 Public Opinion
Quarterly 506, 507-09 (1998) (describing experiments on
social pressure to conform to norms against prejudice).
“Some jurors will intentionally deceive the courts,
perhaps because they are ashamed to admit attitudes
that are socially unfashionable or even because they
might welcome the chance to seek retaliation against a
litigant.” Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving
“Its Wonderful Power”, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 554 (1975).
And “the more prejudiced or bigoted the jurors, the less
they can be expected to confess forthrightly and candidly
their state of mind in open court.” Id.
Indeed, the present case provides a self-contained
demonstration. During the voir dire process, prospective
jurors were repeatedly asked routine questions about
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whether they could be “fair” and whether they had
feelings “for or against” petitioner. Pet. App. 3a. No juror
acknowledged any racial or ethnic bias. Id. Two of the
seated jurors have since alleged that in the intimacy and
relative familiarity of the jury room, and in the absence of
authority figures and public scrutiny, a juror made
repeated statements to the effect that the jury should
convict the defendant “because he’s Mexican.” Pet. App.
4a. Overt bias was thus intertwined with the juror’s view
of the defendant’s culpability. When a “grave” case such
as this arises, the sole mechanism for addressing the bias
is likely to be consideration of statements made during
deliberations and brought to light by a juror after the
verdict. United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (CA1
2009).
Although courts applying Rule 606(b) to potential
racial or ethnic bias point to the possibility that jurors can
express concerns about deliberations prior to the verdict,
that rarely occurs. See Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d
1144, 1155 (D.C. 2013); Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571
N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991). As in this case, jurors
typically come forward only after a verdict is rendered.
The surface protections set forth in Tanner thus will not
suffice to protect Sixth Amendment rights because postverdict juror testimony is likely to be “the only available
evidence to establish racist juror misconduct.” Racist
Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1595, 1596 (1988). Accordingly, when a criminal
defendant proffers juror testimony pointing to a racially
discriminatory verdict, courts should be permitted to
consider that evidence.
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III.

A NARROW EXCEPTION FOR CONSIDERATION
OF
JUROR
TESTIMONY
ABOUT
DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS AS TO A
DEFENDANT’S GUILT OR INNOCENCE IS
WORKABLE
AND
CONSONANT
WITH
EXISTING EXCEPTIONS TO 606(B).

A narrow constitutional exception to consider juror
testimony on racial or ethnic bias will not meaningfully
increase the burden on jurors or on courts. The
jurisdictions adhering to the no-impeachment rule in
cases of such bias express traditional concerns with
undermining finality, disrupting privacy, and inviting
juror harassment. But despite admission of impeachment
in many courts, there has been no “barrage of postverdict
scrutiny of juror conduct.” Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21.
Many jurisdictions are already hospitable to juror
impeachment on the question of racial or ethnic bias, and
their experience suggests that the courts can readily sort
and evaluate such claims when they arise. Three federal
courts of appeals and seven state courts of last resort
have held that no-impeachment rules should not preclude
consideration of a juror’s racially prejudiced statements
offered to establish a violation of the constitutional right
to a fair trial. See, e.g., Kittle, 65 A.3d at 1153 nn.9 &10.
Permitting juror impeachment on these issues does not
appear to have increased post-verdict juror harassment,
has not opened the door to juror testimony beyond a
subset of cases involving invidious discrimination directed
at the defendant, and has not required courts to evaluate
mental processes within the jury deliberations.
Jurors’ post-trial interactions with counsel and
investigators would be little altered by broader
application of the constitutional exception. In states that
recognize the exception, as in states that do not, juror
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contact rules and ethical canons already discourage
parties from seeking juror statements after trial. The
Colorado Code of Professional Conduct, for example,
prohibits post-discharge communications with jurors that
involve
“misrepresentation,
coercion,
duress
or
harassment.” Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.5(c)(3). In fact, the
present case arose because two jurors voluntarily
expressed their misgivings about the deliberations.
Rather than protecting the reporting jurors, a strict
construction of the rule frustrated their efforts to expose
the possibility of a tainted verdict.
Moreover, inherent limiting principles circumscribe
the cases in which an exception for racist statements
would be applicable. Even the courts that have recognized
a constitutional override in cases of alleged prejudice only
hear testimony when the statements directly relate to the
Sixth Amendment concern by implicating objective facts
about the case. The Sixth Amendment issue arises when
the juror’s statements are linked with consideration of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence and “received and utilized
by the jury in an evidentiary context.” Smith v. Brewster,
444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978). The scope of the
constitutional exception is thus narrow. It applies only to
specific racial or ethnic animus pertaining to the
defendant and applied to the substance of the case.
Accordingly, comments made by jurors to non-jurors,
Wright, 559 F. Supp. at 1129, statements to nondeliberating jurors, United States v. Shalhout, 507 Fed.
Appx. 201, 207 (CA3 2012), and offhand remarks after a
verdict had already been reached, Shillcutt v. Gagnon,
827 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (CA7 1987), have all been held
inadmissible.
The statements in question must also be subject to
corroboration. See Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874)
(“If one [juror] affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven
can deny.”). The California Evidence Code, for example,
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permits juror testimony about statements made during
deliberations, but only with regard to statements that
give rise to a presumption of misconduct just because they
were uttered. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1150(a); In re
Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 398 (1985). The California
courts have rejected speculative claims or subjective
impressions of prejudice. Id. In many jurisdictions that
permit juror impeachment to address racial prejudice,
courts have similarly declined to review statements of
bias that do not relate to “specific readily identifiable facts
or actions as opposed to evidence of subjective mental
attitudes on the part of a juror.” Laguer, 571 N.E. 2d at
376; see also United States v. Brassler, 651 F.2d 600, 603
(CA8 1981); People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ill.
1978). A constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) thus
would only render testimony about racist statements
admissible when that testimony can be proven or
disproven. The objective verifiability of the evidence
alleviates any concern with juror fraud or the possibility
that a disgruntled juror could invent misconduct.
Furthermore, only overtly racist statements
directed at the evidence—not stray remarks, insults
exchanged between jurors, or even indications of general
bigotry unrelated to the defendant—would render
statements during deliberations admissible. See Villar,
586 F.3d at 87; Shalhout, 507 Fed. Appx. at 206-07.
Despite the permissive approach to juror impeachment in
the California rules, for example, courts there have held
that the statements in question must constitute more
than mere suggestions of racist thinking. See People v.
Steele, 4 P.3d 225, 248 (Cal. 2002). Accordingly, courts
have rejected testimony concerning general references to
racial stereotypes during deliberations, as well as alleged
statements equally applicable to gang membership or
racial status. See People v. Ali, 2013 WL 452901, at *19
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013).
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These screening mechanisms are similar to the
ones that courts use when confronted with allegations of
external influences on jury deliberations, which are
already admissible pursuant to Rule 606(b)(2). Granting
review of evidence of racial or ethnic bias thus will not
upset the existing balance between exposing juror
misconduct and shoring up the finality and legitimacy of
verdicts. As with allegations of racially-tainted remarks,
claims of external influence are subject to corroboration
and refutation. The only initial question is whether the
information was received or the influence occurred.
Impact on the verdict is a separate inquiry.
Faced, for example, with an allegation of bribery or
receipt of extraneous information, a court first allows
testimony to determine whether the act occurred. See,
e.g., Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d
914, 917 (CA7 1991) (proper procedure is to establish
“whether the communication was made and what it
contained” “without asking the jurors anything further
and emphatically without asking them what role the
communication played in their thoughts or discussion”).
The same basic objective analysis applies when
allegations arise that jurors made racially prejudiced
statements. Courts need only determine “whether the
communication was made and what it contained.” Id.
They make no subjective inquiry into the role that the
communication played in deliberations.
Therefore, broader recognition of a constitutional
exception would encompass only the objectively verifiable
statements of a juror and would not require examination
of the internal mental processes that Rule 606(b) was
drafted to protect. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), Advisory
Committee Note (the rule shields “mental operations and
emotional reactions” during the jury’s deliberative
process); see also Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287,
1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing “objective evidence of
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matters improperly introduced and considered by the jury
in its verdict”). Courts need not analyze the jury’s actual
reasoning process or engage in an ex post assessment of
whether the jury was affected by the racist assertions.
This is so in evaluating a remedy for the violation
as well as its existence. The issue of remedy is not before
the Court, as the only question presented is whether the
evidence of bias lies behind the 606(b) shield. Rule 606(b)
clearly states that it “does not purport to specify the
substantive grounds for setting aside verdicts for
irregularity.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), Advisory Committee
Note. Under either of the approaches currently employed,
however, the remedial step will not implicate the jury’s
reasoning process in deliberations.
Under one approach, many lower courts have
concluded that the Sixth Amendment right is violated “if
even one member of the jury harbors racial prejudice.”
United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (CA7 1973).
According to this view, proven racial bias on the part of a
juror constitutes “a structural defect not subject to
harmless error analysis.” State v. Phillips, 927 A.2d 931,
934-36 (Conn. App. 2007); see also State v. Santiago, 715
A.2d 1, 20 (Conn. 1998) (“Allegations of racial bias on the
part of a juror are fundamentally different from other
types of juror misconduct because such conduct is, ipso
facto, prejudicial.”). That conclusion would be consistent
with this Court’s holding in Gray that jury impartiality is
“so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be
treated as harmless error.” 481 U.S. at 668 (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).
Under a second approach, whether or not to grant a
new trial has generally turned on the “substantial
likelihood that the alleged racial slur would have made a
difference in the outcome.” Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1158-59;
see also Commonwealth v. McCowen, 939 N.E.2d 735,
765-66 (Mass. 2010). In making that determination about
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remedy, courts confronting statements of racial bias have
also looked to external indications like the jury’s decision
to acquit on some charges, Shalhout, 507 Fed. Appx. at
207, or overwhelming evidence of guilt that reduces
concern about racial bias infecting a verdict. Fields v.
Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1006-07 (CA9 2002). Unlike the
admissibility inquiry, which looks only to the objective
existence of the racial or ethnic prejudice and the nature
and timing of the statements in question, the remedial
step accounts for extrinsic indications of the impact on the
verdict.
This approach would involve the same burdenshifting framework that operates when there are
allegations of extraneous prejudicial information under
Rule 606(b)(2). See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90
F.3d 490, 497 (CADC 1996) (questioning whether there is
a reasonable possibility that the outside intrusion affected
the verdict). Once the defendant establishes, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the jury was exposed
to racially biased statements that infected the judicial
process, the burden shifts to the state to show that there
was no prejudice. The judge then considers “the probable
effect” of the statements “on a hypothetical average jury.”
McCowen, 939 N.E.2d at 766; see also, e.g., Villar, 586
F.3d at 87 (district court determined on remand that the
verdict was not tainted by the racially discriminatory
statements and could stand).
Petitioner would likely be entitled to a new trial in
this case regardless of the remedial approach. The juror’s
statements were “directly tied to the determination of the
defendant’s guilt.” Pet. App. 26a (Marquez, J., dissenting).
A juror allegedly stated, on more than one occasion during
deliberations, that he believed the defendant was guilty
“because he’s Mexican.” Pet. App. 4a. Petitioner’s case
was close and dependent on a problematic identification,
and the jury indicated initial deadlock on all four charges.
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Moreover, the case turned in important respects on the
credibility of an alibi witness whose testimony the juror at
the center of this appeal discredited after (erroneously)
labeling the alibi witness an “illegal.” Pet. App. 4a-5a; Tr.
14 (Feb. 25, 2010).
The bias expressed here is severe, focused on the
defendant’s ethnicity, and clearly connected with
consideration of the facts of the case. The trial court in
fact acknowledged that the juror testimony exposed
prejudice in the deliberations, but then ruled that the bias
could not support a new trial because of the noimpeachment rule. Tr. 3 (July 20, 2010).
In future cases in which a defendant likewise
proffers juror impeachment involving blatant expressions
of racism inserted into jury deliberations as an argument
in favor of guilt, every court should have access to the
relevant testimony. There is no reason to think that
jurors are forfeiting meaningful protections in such a
case, or that courts are incapable of screening for
legitimate constitutional claims.
IV.

THE POLICIES SUPPORTING 606(B) ARE BEST
SERVED BY ALLOWING JUROR TESTIMONY
IN CASES OF ALLEGED RACIAL OR ETHNIC
BIAS.

The Colorado Supreme Court’s 4-3 decision in this
case turned in large part on the policy implications of
recognizing a constitutional exception to Rule 606(b). See
Pet. App. 13a-15a. To be sure, the rule may give effect to
concerns about intrusion into the jury room and public
confidence in the finality of verdicts. Because of the
nature of the statements at issue, however, there are
important institutional interests that counsel in favor of
permitting inquiry into alleged statements of racial or
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ethnic prejudice. That inquiry could support not only the
accuracy of criminal verdicts and the unbiased
administration of justice, but also the integrity and
legitimacy of the jury system as a whole.
Concern with “chilling” jury deliberations has no
force when racist speech is at issue. In addition, jurors
neither expect nor enjoy complete privacy. Rule 606(b) has
always permitted non-juror testimony, as well as the use
of pre-verdict statements. The rule further allows postverdict testimony about external influences even by
jurors, and it does not address juror revelations outside of
court. “Juror journalism” and public discussion about jury
service is not uncommon in high profile cases. The
Colorado court’s construction of the rule thus permits
wide reporting in the public domain of racially prejudiced
statements by jurors while precluding any redress in
court.
Perhaps the strongest arguments favoring strict
interpretation of Rule 606(b) concern the validity of jury
decisionmaking itself, but those also lack force when
weighed against the harm of racial or ethnic bias. It is
true that jury discussions might, upon close scrutiny, fall
short of ideals about the deliberative process. Jury
perfection remains an “untenable goal.” Benally, 546 F.3d
at 1240. Racial prejudice is among the most dangerous of
the jury’s imperfections, however, and when it reveals
itself openly, confronting the available evidence will do
more to preserve the institution of the jury than ignoring
it.
Indeed, the injury of racist factfinding is not
limited to the criminal defendant deprived of a fair trial.
As this Court has recognized, prejudice causes injury “to
the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected
in the process of our courts.” Rose, 443 U.S. at 556. A rigid
interpretation of Rule 606(b) in the face of allegations of
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racial or ethnic bias affects not only the fundamental
fairness of the trial but the appearance of fairness in the
public eye. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49 (“One of the
goals of our jury system is to impress upon the criminal
defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of
conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law
by persons who are fair.”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (stating
that the “harm from discriminatory jury selection extends
beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded
juror to touch the entire community” and “undermine
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice”).
When a decision is based on bigotry, removing the
deliberations from the court’s purview does nothing to
preserve the integrity of the jury. Both defendants and
society may become aware of express juror prejudice
through post-trial disclosures, and then look to the court
to determine the constitutional significance of that bias.
Only in some jurisdictions does that assessment occur,
however, and this Court should resolve the split and
ensure consistent consideration of juror testimony as to
racially biased statements by jurors about a criminal
defendant’s guilt.
If “‘smoking guns’ are ignored, we have little hope
of combating the more subtle forms of racial
discrimination” in the criminal justice system. Wilkerson
v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Although this Court has recognized that the
jury system might not survive “efforts to perfect it,”
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120, neither can it survive efforts to
protect it by shielding racial prejudice from review.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.

